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Abstract 
The following project contains an investigation of the 
philosopher David Hume’s religious views based on an 
analysis and interpretation of the work Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion. The investigation includes a 
profile to David Hume and an account for the 
Enlightenment period to provide background knowledge 
for a deeper understanding of his motives. The characters 
of Dialogues are introduced and an analysis of the most 
important arguments presented. Via a comparison and 
discussion of the Dialogues and Hume’s Of Miracles, Of 
Suicide and Of the Immortality of the Soul the project 
reflects and concludes on Hume’s religious views. 
Through the investigation this project conclusively finds 
David Hume to be a religious sceptic. 
 
Summary 
Projektet søger at definere David Humes holdning 
omkring konceptet naturlig religion, og hvordan hans 
filosofi underbygger denne. Med hovedvægt på Hume’s 
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, samt støtte fra 
Hume’s Of Miracles, Of Suicide, Of the Immortality of the 
Soul, My Own Life og Letters from Hume, vil Humes 
overbevisning i fht. spørgsmålet omkring naturlig religion 
blive undersøgt. En argumentationsanalyse af holdningen 
for design og det kosmologiske argument for guds 
eksistens, samt problemet med ondskab vil blive 
gennemgået. En diskussion af Humes position i Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion, koblet med en 
sammenligning til den førnævnte primære litteratur, fører 
os til at konkludere Hume som en religiøs skeptiker. 
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Methodology 
Working with this philosophical project has required a 
humanistic approach to Hume’s works and external 
understandings of these. Deeper analyses and 
interpretations have thus been conducted upon both the 
primary and secondary literature, which have been 
included in the investigation process. Analyses of the 
arguments presented by Hume have in particular been 
significant in order to reach the aim of this project. The 
method course of Science & Philosophy this semester has 
thus provided us with tools to go in depth with the 
arguments presented by Hume through an argumentation 
analysis.  
The humanistic methodology in general favors qualitative 
research methods. In this project it is exemplified since it 
has its focus on an investigation of primary literature. In 
order to interpret Hume’s texts more accurately, a critical 
approach to the historical background of the texts has been 
implemented. As such, the readings and interpretations of 
the texts has been our essential working method within the 
humanities.  
The fundamental difficulties with such work methods 
bases itself upon our own interpretation of the text i.e. 
whether our interpretation stands in accordance to the 
sought communicated content of the literature. By 
implementing secondary literature, the interpretation and 
conclusion reached, is supported. 
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Introduction 
David Hume is, to this day, considered to be one of the 
most important writers in the field of philosophy. Hume is 
described as an important figure in what is called the 
Scottish Enlightenment and has thus been a major 
influence in the establishment of the modern world. 
Philosophers who have been directly influenced by him 
include Immanuel Kant, who claimed to have been 
awakened from his dogmatic slumbers by Hume’s writings 
(Brown & Morris ed., 2012: 9-12). Through various 
sources, including Hume’s autobiography My Own Life, 
this introduction aims to give an account for the character 
of Hume. This will be done with the aid of a reflection on 
the age of Enlightenment, in order to shed light on 
possible influences on Hume. Furthermore, to gain an 
understanding of the controversial publications that 
divided the people in the 18th century. 
David Hume was born in Edinburgh in 1711 on April 26th 
to Katherine Falconer and Joseph Hume. As a 
consequence of the loss of his father at the early age of 
two, Hume developed a boundless admiration and respect 
for his widowed mother to whom he credits all his early 
educational achievements “… a woman of singular merit, 
who, though young and handsome, devoted herself entirely 
to the rearing and education of her children.” (Brown & 
Morris ed., 2012: 853). 
Early in his life Hume developed a passion for reading, 
which eventually became a major influential source on the 
development of his philosophical visions. 
“I passed through the ordinary course of my 
education with success, and was seized very early with a 
passion for literature, which has been the ruling passion 
of my life, and the greatest source of my enjoyments” 
(Brown & Morris ed., 2012: 853). 
 6  
He started at University of Edinburgh at the age of 11, 
where he completed his education successfully. In 1734 he 
began working on one of his more important philosophical 
writings, Treatise of Human Nature, which was published 
in the end of 1738. It was, however, poorly received 
leading Hume to recast it and republish many of his ideas 
in a new publication An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding. Hume later described this as his definitive 
work. Hume subsequently held many lucrative non-
academic positions around Europe, while publishing 
various papers until his death in 1776 (Brown & Morris, 
2012: 9-12). These jobs were not particularly profitable, 
however, Hume did earn a lot of money with the 
publication of his History of England.  His philosophy is 
claimed to be highly influenced by philosophers such as 
George Berkeley and John Locke, whose theory of 
empiricism in particular was an influential source. Locke, 
Berkeley and Hume are all empiricist philosophers. Their 
philosophies differ on various levels but agree on three 
anchor points: The only source of genuine knowledge is 
through sense experience. Reason is an unreliable and 
inadequate route to knowledge unless it is grounded in the 
solid bedrock of sense experience. There is furthermore no 
evidence of innate ideas within the mind, which are not 
known from experience. 
Hume’s later work includes Dialogues Concerning 
Natural Religion (Dialogues), which is considered his 
most controversial. Published posthumously in 1779, this 
text depicts a debate between three fictional characters, 
Demea, Philo and Cleanthes, concerning the existence of 
god. The debate is presented as a fictional letter containing 
an account of the dialogues between these three characters, 
observed by the young student Pamphilus. However, 
Pamphilus role as a narrator remains insignificant to the 
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discussion throughout the dialogues, and his subjectivity 
seems merely present at the end when he concludes 
Cleanthes’ arguments to be nearest the probable truth 
(Popkin ed., 1998: 89). 
As a direct consequence of Hume’s subversive approach to 
religion, Dialogues was not published until after his death. 
Hume was recommended by various friends not to publish 
it at all (Pyle, 2006: 3) due to the historical background of 
Hume’s surrounding society. Prior to the Enlightenment, 
the society of Scotland was, along with most of Europe, 
established around Christianity and blasphemy was 
consequently punished hard due to the Scottish 
‘blasphemy law’.  In 1697 the young student Thomas 
Aikenhead was persecuted in accordance with the 
blasphemy law and executed for having read and 
supported works of ‘so-called atheists’ such as Descartes, 
Spinoza and Hobbes (Hill, 2013). Aikenhead was the last 
man to be hung in Britain, just fifteen years before Hume’s 
birth. He is famously remembered for uttering “I wish 
right now I was in the place Ezra called Hell to warm 
myself there” just before his death (Hill, 2013). The 
Church of Scotland even considered filing charges against 
Hume for his publications before his death and the release 
of Dialogues (Mossner, 2001: 206).  
 
Aim of the project 
This paper aims to investigate the religious views of the 
Scottish philosopher David Hume. This will be done 
through analysing and interpreting the philosophical work 
Dialogues. In order to clarify Hume’s personal view on 
religion, additional philosophical works of Hume and 
other secondary literature elaborating on Hume’s theories, 
will be analysed and included in the discussion. The 
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project aims to cover the dimension of ‘Science and 
Philosophy’. The problem formulation reads as follows: 
What were David Hume’s views on religion and how did 
he justify them? 
- What beliefs do the three different characters 
of Dialogues represent and how do their arguments 
justify these views? 
 -    How does the style of writing and the strength 
of the arguments reflect David Hume’s view on 
religion? 
 -    How does Dialogues reflect David Hume’s 
view on religion in accordance with his other 
works? 
The examination of Dialogues consequently consists of an 
account of the three main characters, investigating their 
arguments and personas. These will subsequently be 
analysed and further elaborated on through the use of 
argumentation analyses. The strength of the various 
arguments will be used as guidance to interpret Hume’s 
personal views on them. Furthermore, it will be discussed 
why Hume has chosen the dialogue form as his style of 
writing in this particular work. Finally, analyses and 
interpretations of the above mentioned works of Hume 
will be integrated and discussed in relation to Dialogues. 
This leads the project to establish a conclusion on Hume’s 
views on religion. 
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The Characters 
As previously described, a presentation and analysis of the 
characters in Dialogues will be implemented to investigate 
their separate opinions. This allows for a deeper 
understanding of the characters’ religious views and will 
contribute to place David Hume’s personal beliefs among 
them. 
 
Cleanthes 
Cleanthes embraces the position of the ‘religious 
philosopher’ and as the defender of the argument of design 
in Dialogues. 
Advocating for the argument of design Cleanthes 
distinguishes his beliefs from the more abstract a priori 
argument. According to Paul Russell, the a priori argument 
was by its more abstract nature, not a willingly accepted 
and easily understood argument for the broader 
population. This provided the grounds for the design, or a 
posteriori, position (Russell, 2013). 
The argument of design originates in the amazement of the 
natural order of the universe and admiration of how each 
part contribute to the whole, pointing towards a ‘creator’ 
or ‘designer’ (Gaskin, 1978: 9). This is the aspect of the 
argument in which Cleanthes states his position. The 
argument of design will be further explained in the 
argumentation analysis. 
The stress upon observation and experience is derived 
from the rise of science and philosophy through the 
Enlightenment (Østergaard ed., 2008: 1067), Cleanthes 
thereby embodies the position of the theological scientist. 
The world is looked upon as a machine that functions by 
the workings of its smaller parts (Popkin ed., 1998: 15). 
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As a consequence of Kepler’s laws regarding the planet’s 
orbiting around the sun, Copernicus’ idea of the 
heliocentric system gave better predictions than the former 
geocentric system. Equally the construction of Galileo’s 
telescope meant a new view upon our own position in the 
universe. The role of the natural sciences and philosophy 
became more apparent (Østergaard ed., 2008: 1067). 
These advances in the natural sciences culminated in the 
publication of Philosophae Naturalis Principa 
Mathematica by Isaac Newton. His three laws of gravity 
led to an ability to connect the theories of Galileo and 
Kepler. Newton became an image of the temper of the 
enlightenment i.e. the conception that nature is explainable 
through the human mind (Østergaard ed., 2008: 1068). 
This new scientific approach led to a greater interest in the 
surrounding world, meaning that knowledge could now be 
found by focusing upon the natural order of the world. As 
a result, classical science influenced the views on god and 
the position of theists in broader societal aspects as well as 
the discussion of god entered the domain in new ways.  
The nature and attributes of god came into question as the 
discussion entered a new era, questioning the order of the 
world. The incomprehensibility of god quickly became 
apparent and the necessity of an argument, which imposed 
the Christian conceptions of omnipotence, omniscience 
and eternal good in a deity, became apparently possible 
through the argument of design. The advocates for the 
argument of design implicate the analogy between the 
mind of god and that of man to infer seeming human 
attributes to god. Cleanthes stands in opposition to Philo 
and Demea from the very beginning of Dialogues when 
the discussion treats the appropriate time for introducing 
students to the principles of religion. From then on the line 
has been drawn and Cleanthes finds himself defending his 
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opinions against both Philo and Demea on many 
occasions. Though being shaken by Philo and finding it 
difficult to counterpoint his reasoning, Cleanthes stands 
firm in his beliefs throughout Dialogues not deviating 
much from his initial standpoint.  
Cleanthes strongly supports the approach of using human 
reasoning as a means to comprehend god instead of using 
it to deny his existence, implementing Locke as an 
example to follow. He explains that by stating that god is 
incomprehensible, believing in him would not be possible 
since existence is, if not an attribute in itself, then at least a 
state only made possible by a collection of attributes 
(Popkin ed., 1998: 29). These strong opinions are what 
keeps Philo and Demea pinned against Cleanthes 
throughout Dialogues and it is also the cause of the, at 
times, somewhat heated nature of Demea’s statements. 
At the end of Dialogues the focus of the conversation 
moves on to organised religion. In contrast to Philo, 
Cleanthes believes that organised religion is meaningful. 
This purpose being to: “…regulate the hearts of men, 
humanize their conduct, infuse the spirit of temperance, 
order, and obedience…” (Popkin ed., 1998: 82). In other 
words, organised religion is what keeps humans acting 
civil. When confronted with the possibility of human 
civility being achieved by simple man-made laws upheld 
by a system of reward and punishment, Cleanthes states 
that such a solution would not be as effective. He reasons 
that if mankind can be held at bay with a simple system of 
actions and consequences, the actions would be even more 
civilised if the consequences were to continue into eternity 
(Popkin ed., 1998: 82). Cleanthes is hereby suggesting that 
organised religion makes sure that we fear, not only for the 
consequences of here and now, but also for what 
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consequences our actions might have after we die. This 
enhanced fear is what keeps humans civilised.  
 
Demea 
Demea is introduced as being a true orthodox. His belief in 
the existence of god is pure and without doubts. His only 
confusion exists in establishing the nature of god. He 
believes, however, that man’s imperfection makes him 
incapable of comprehending god and this should therefore 
not even be attempted (Popkin ed., 1998: 13). In Part I of 
the Dialogues, Demea initiates the discussion by 
complimenting Cleanthes for his caretaking of his young 
student Pamphilus. Demea shares subsequently the 
methods used by Cleanthes in the education of students: 
“Students of philosophy ought first to learn logic, then 
ethics, next physics, last of all the nature of gods” (Popkin 
ed., 1998: 3). This he defends by claiming that the mind 
must reach a certain matureness before being introduced to 
the most difficult matter ie. religion. Demea’s aim for his 
students is furthermore for them to realize how limited the 
field of philosophy is, thereby removing a plausible 
arrogance that might try to dismiss religious beliefs on 
behalf of reason. 
Demea primarily argues for the existence of god claiming 
that god’s existence is self-evident and so is his infinite 
powers. He claims that god’s existence is unquestionable 
while his nature is beyond human understanding due to the 
imperfection of man. Demea justifies the existence of god 
by asserting that there must be a cause for everything, as 
well as a beginning for this chain of causes. Hence, there 
must be a being containing the cause of its own existence; 
there must be a deity (Popkin ed., 1998: 54). Concerning 
the understanding of god’s nature, Demea claims that 
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humans are not able to comprehend it, neither should they 
try to. He justifies his views by pointing out that almost 
any theological texts written since the establishment of 
Christianity acknowledges the same belief, and 
exemplifies this by quoting ‘Father Malebranche’ on this 
matter: “That his true name is He that is, or, in other 
words Being without restriction, All being, the being 
infinite and universal” (Popkin ed., 1998: 13). 
Demea is critical towards Cleanthes’ arguments. He 
criticises him particularly for comparing humans to god, 
stating that the mind of god is too incomprehensible to 
humans to make such an analogy. He supports his 
argument by comparing the author of a book to god 
resembling the author of the universe, which contains 
inexplicable riddles. He furthermore criticises Cleanthes 
for using a posteriori arguments, and thereby creating a 
probable truth rather than a definite truth. His criticism 
towards the a posteriori argument is additionally caused by 
its inferiority to the a priori argument, which, he claims, 
offers an infallible proof (Popkin ed., 1998: 54).  
Demea’s argument for the existence of god is attacked by 
both Philo and Cleanthes. Consequently he turns to a 
rather pessimistic argument, claiming that man’s faith in 
god must be preserved in order to stand the evil existing in 
the world (Popkin ed., 1998: 60). Returning to a previous 
argument, Demea asserts that if the argument of design is 
to be true, the world has merely been designed in order to 
make species breed without any other purpose. He 
furthermore states that there is more evil than good to be 
found in the world, by claiming that pain always last 
longer than pleasure (Popkin ed., 1998: 64-65). This 
argument introduces a dialogue between Philo and 
Cleanthes concerning the attributes of god. After Philo has 
concluded that god is morally neutral and his powers are in 
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fact finite, Demea excuses himself and leaves the 
dialogues (Popkin ed., 1998: 76). This symbolic action 
fairly summarizes Demea’s role in the dialogues: Due to 
his rather vague arguments and persistent position, Demea 
seems to function as a scapegoat who merely introduces 
arguments, which Philo and Cleanthes can demolish and 
thereby prove their points.  
	  
Philo 
Philo represents the sceptical approach to religion. This 
entails that all declared truths should be well supported by 
evidence. Through his questioning of any matter of debate, 
scepticism appears to be Philo’s natural approach. 
According to Philo, you can only reach true religion 
through scepticism since this approach rules out all false 
evidence. By questioning everything, only direct 
experiences of a deity remains (Popkin ed., 1998: 83). 
In Part I Philo argues for the weakness and narrow limits 
of the human mind, seemingly supporting that knowledge 
cannot be reached through reason. Neither can man trust 
his senses since they continually deceive us (Popkin ed., 
1998: 4). Philo agrees with Demea’s claims of the self-
evidential existence of god and that true faith comes from 
within (Popkin ed., 1998: 14). 
Philo advocates thus in Part II that it is self evident that 
there is a cause for the world, since every effect must have 
a cause. Given that humans have chosen to name this 
cause ‘god’, the existence of a deity is unquestionable. 
What cannot be certain is the nature of this god. Due to the 
chain of causes and effects it is clear that the universe 
must have a general cause. The problem lies within 
determining this cause. Comparing a house to the universe 
 15  
proves pointless since the universe surely is too grandeur. 
It is thus impossible to draw conclusions on something as 
comprehensive as the universe by comparing it to human 
artefacts. This belief is contrary to the argument of design 
presented by Cleanthes. He argues that despite of not 
having the necessary experience, we still know that it is 
the work of an intelligent designer. He perceives this as an 
analogy between the creation of a book and the creation of 
the universe (Popkin ed., 1998: 24). Philo continues to 
question the order of the universe and the order of god’s 
thoughts. There must be a cause for god since everything 
has a cause.However, if there is a cause for everything the 
continuation would go on in infinitum. Mankind would be 
better off not to question anything beyond their own 
material world, since they would never be able understand 
the full extent of the universe. Looking beyond ourselves 
only opens a path of eternal questions (Popkin ed., 1998: 
33). 
Philo does not only claim that the argument of design 
leaves unanswered questions but also that it does not 
explain the order of the universe. “... that a mental world 
or universe of ideas requires a cause as much as does a 
material world or universe of objects; and if similar in its 
arrangement, must require a similar cause” (Popkin ed., 
1998: 30). The material world is perceived as being a 
picture of god’s mental world, meaning that due to the 
similarities in cause and effect, the two worlds must derive 
from the same cause. If the world was first created in the 
mind of god, then it is unknown how this plan occurred. 
Due to the chain of cause and effect, the plan in god’s 
mind must require a cause as well. “Like effects prove like 
causes.” (Popkin ed., 1998: 34). Philo attempts by similar 
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reasoning to disprove the similarity between the universe 
and human design. 
Philo disputes Cleanthes by insisting that the universe 
resembles an animal far more than a machine. The human 
experience of how the mind controls the body is the main 
feature of this analogy. From experience it is known that 
thoughts and ideas control bodies, and how the different 
parts of the body work together. Through experience it can 
be concluded that a mind without a body or a body without 
a mind has never been observed. If the world resembles an 
animal, which is more likely, it can be assumed that the 
body must have a mind. The only mind, which can be in 
charge of such a body as the universe, would be the creator 
of it all. Conclusively there must be a god (Popkin ed., 
1998: 39). 
If the universe resembles an animal or vegetable more than 
it resembles human artefacts, the cause must do so as well. 
Therefore, it is more likely that the world has sprung from 
vegetation or generation than from a designer. In nature it 
is experienced how trees shed seeds to propagate. 
Likewise the world could have emerged from a seed shed 
by another planet. The order of the world could have been 
held inside a comet. When the comet finally hit Earth, it 
was ripened and life arose from it. The parable of a comet 
carrying the seed of life on planet Earth shows a very 
scientific approach. In the time where Dialogues was 
written, the common perception of how the world was 
created was still based on the belief in a divine being 
generating it all. By suggesting that life on Earth arose 
from nature itself, Hume shows to possess an 
understanding seemingly ahead of his time.  
Philo states that the human mind and understanding are so 
insufficient that it is impossible to grasp the entirety of the 
universe. An explanation of the human existence is 
 17  
required in order for humans to find peace within their 
minds. Philo subsequently asks why humans do not just 
settle on the explanation that seems most likely. The best 
explanations are given by analogies and since the 
resemblance between a vegetable and nature is greater 
than that between machines and nature, it seems most 
likely that the world sprung from vegetation or generation 
than deliberate design (Popkin ed., 1998: 47). 
Philo presents the Epicurean hypothesis but supposes 
matter to be finite rather than infinite. If the world spans 
over an infinite amount of time, and matter is considered 
finite, the result would be that every possible constellation 
of matter would be tested. If we supposed “…that matter 
was thrown into any position by a blind, unguided 
force;…” (Popkin ed., 1998: 51) this position would most 
likely be “...confused and most disorderly imaginable…” 
(Popkin ed., 1998: 51). If this blind, unguided force ceased 
to exist everything in the universe would hence be in 
forever disorder. If we were to speculate that this force 
would continue its existence within matter itself; the first 
position of things would cease to exist and instead give 
way for a new one, repeating this until it settles on an 
order: “This world, therefore, with all its events, even the 
most minute, has therefore been produced and destroyed, 
and will again be produced and destroyed, without any 
bounds and limitations” (Popkin ed., 1998: 49).  
Laws like gravity, electricity and elasticity are all set in 
motion by matter and require energy from other matters. 
When these matters disappear the energy will find new 
matters to set in motion. No particles in the universe stand 
absolutely still. “Every individual is perpetually changing, 
and every part of every individual; and yet the whole 
remains, in appearance, the same.” (Popkin ed., 1998: 51). 
The argument of cosmogony might be imperfect and with 
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exceptions, but a system without any exceptions will never 
be possible since human knowledge lacks a perfect 
understanding regarding the whole of nature (Popkin ed., 
1998: 52). These exceptions are presented by Cleanthes 
who claims that disordered arrangements do not survive 
since they are not the fittest, contradictory the more 
ordered arrangements the more fit. Philo himself is 
sceptical towards this argument but he maintains the belief 
that the best way to look at the world is through the eyes 
of scepticism. 
“And if every attack, as is commonly observed, and 
no defence among theologians is successful, how complete 
must be his victory who remains always, with all mankind, 
on the offensive, and has himself no fixed station or 
abiding city which he is ever, on any occasion, obliged to 
defend?” (Popkin ed., 1998: 53).  
Philo hereby defends his own methods by stating that 
acquiring a sceptic standpoint and remaining offensive, 
one will forever be victorious in his argumentation.  
Philo states that it is the fear of death which keeps us 
chained to this otherwise miserable life. The importance is 
not to prove the existence of god but merely to maintain 
faith. The world seems to contain infinite wars between all 
living creatures. “Not satisfied with life, afraid of death” 
(Popkin ed., 1998: 61). This is the secret chain that binds 
us to religion. The fear of death and terror leads humans to 
believe that pain is needed in order to maintain the belief 
in god and to sustain life. Since neither humans nor 
animals are perfectly happy, Philo questions god’s 
benevolence.  
The anthropomorphic argument of a deity is by the 
problem of evil encumbered by an image of god with 
infinite benevolence, power and goodness. If god is 
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anthropomorphic then why would he not antagonize evil? 
This leads to the unanswered questions of Epicurus. “Is he 
willing to prevent evil, but not able? then he is impotent. Is 
he able, but not willing? then he is malevolent. Is he both 
able and willing? whence then is evil?” (Popkin ed., 1998: 
63). If it is supposed that there is more happiness than 
misery in the world it would still not be sufficient evidence 
for a benevolent god. It is not what should be expected, 
which would be a world without evil. Philo’s only 
explanation seems to be that our human minds cannot 
comprehend the cause of god. The problem of evil will 
remain unanswered since god cannot be blamed for what 
cannot be understood. The world might be the best world 
god could have created with the resources available. 
Philo draws an analogy between the universe and an ugly 
palace: If an architect builds a palace but his resources are 
limited, he can only do so to the extent of these. The 
architect would be blamed for the ugly palace even though 
he made the best possible. This analogy allows the idea of 
a good and benevolent god, however, not an almighty one. 
“Is the world, considered in general and as it appears to 
us in this life, different from what a man or such a limited 
being would, beforehand, expect from a very powerful, 
wise and benevolent Deity?” (Popkin ed., 1998: 69). 
Hypothetically, if a man from another world entered Earth 
only knowing that a perfect deity created it, it is doubtful 
that he would expect the evil encountering him. The evil 
experienced is not consistent with what could be expected 
from a benevolent and omnipotent god.  
Philo presents four unavoidable circumstances to be the 
causes of evil. These so-called circumstances form the 
grounds of the argument of evil in Dialogues. If the evil in 
the world is recognised, an omnipotent and benevolent god 
can only be allowed through a priori reasoning. The 
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imperfections in the deity can be explained by the lack of 
human understanding (Popkin ed., 1998: 69). 
Since common sense allows us to see the similarity 
between art and nature, we must grant the causes to be 
alike. However, since there are differences in the effects, 
the causes must contain differences as well. The work of 
nature is much greater, hence the author must be too. This 
leads to the conception of a deity whose main virtue is his 
mind and intelligence. Philo questions why humans do not 
just consider god as a ‘mind’ or ‘thought’, which he 
resembles, if they dislike calling a supreme being ‘god’ or 
‘deity’. Due to individual experiences mankind perceive 
things differently, and thus seldom agree: “The disputants 
may here agree in their sense and differ in the terms, or 
vice versa, yet never be able to define their terms as to 
enter into each other’s meaning” (Popkin ed., 1998: 80). 
Approaching the end of Dialogues Philo’s argumentation 
seems to lean towards the argument of design. He 
continues to underline that he cannot defend organised 
religion, which he perceives as destructive. In spite of 
preaching about moral ethics, it only leads to chaos. 
Organised religion promises a heaven if you are good, 
therefore all good things are done for selfish reasons 
(Popkin ed., 1998: 84). The idea of being stuck between 
heaven and hell only causes terror and horror in man 
(Popkin ed., 1998: 87). 
It seems that Philo is afraid of conflicts and at the end tries 
to hide his real sceptical position. The beliefs represented 
by Philo breaks with the religious norms of the modern 
age. He even begins to argue for something looking very 
similar to Darwin’s theory of Natural Selection. In his 
lifetime Hume was criticised for his sceptical religious 
approach and hence several of his works were published 
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posthumously. This could indicate that Philo’s beliefs 
resemble Hume’s the most.  
The Arguments 
By analysing the different arguments presented by the 
characters of Dialogues, Hume’s own religious opinion 
might shine through. Due to the chosen style of writing, 
the dialogue form, the different arguments can be held 
against each other. The strongest are more likely to 
represent Hume’s personal views. The arguments will be 
analysed and reflected on in accordance with former 
versions and interpretations of them. Variations of the 
arguments visible in Dialogues seems to consist of 
variations of arguments that have been significant within 
philosophical theology. 
 
The Argument of Design 
Of the arguments presented for the existence of god in 
Dialogues, the argument of design is the most extensive. 
The character advocating this argument is Cleanthes. 
It is an empirical argument for the existence of god. The 
course of action in the argument lies within 
analogy.  From observations of empirical traits of the 
world one can establish proof of an intelligent designer, ie. 
god. Scholars from the last two centuries have suggested 
different formulations for the argument of design. From 
here derives the teleological argument and the argument of 
regularity presented by John Charles Addison Gaskin in 
his work Hume’s Philosophy of Religion from 1978. The 
evidence of an intelligent designer having created the 
world was too immense, and thus this explanation needed 
no further discussion. "The argument of design is so old 
and so fundamental a part of human thought” (Parkinson 
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ed.,1988: 339). The first time the argument of design was 
mentioned dates back to Xenophon’s Memorabilia of 
385BC. Observations of organs in living creatures and 
sexual tendencies, specifically with focus on procreation, 
led to the foundation of the teleological idea, ‘the 
purpose’. The second sub-argument, the idea of the natural 
order comes from the 35BC philosophical dialogue De 
Natura Deorum by Cicero (Parkinson ed., 1988: 339). The 
distinct difference between the two arguments considers 
which feature has been emphasised the most. 
In Dialogues the argument of design is firstly presented in 
Part II where Cleanthes is empirically adding his argument 
to Philo’s claim that the universe has some sort of ultimate 
cause. The unified agreement on the existence of god is a 
definitive truth but the nature of him is what is uncertain. 
By the argument of design, Cleanthes is claiming that it is 
neither mysterious nor incomprehensible to us:  
“Look round the world: Contemplate the whole and 
every part of it: You will find it to be nothing but one big 
machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser 
machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree 
beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and 
explain. All these various machines, and even their most 
minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy 
which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever 
contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to 
ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it 
much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance; of 
human design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since 
therefore the effects resemble each other, we are led to 
infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also 
resemble, and that the author of nature is somewhat 
similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much 
larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work 
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which he has executed. By this argument a posteriori, and 
by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence 
of a Deity and his similarity to human mind and 
intelligence” (Popkin ed.,1998:15). 
According to Cleanthes, the proof of god is and has always 
been right in front of us. You need only to ‘look around 
the world’ to see the testimony of god’s nature. The clear 
empirical principles and the analogous implication are the 
foundation of the argument of design. Cleanthes is 
explicitly confronting Demea and his weak a priori 
argument, by asserting that it is only by ways of the a 
posteriori argument that we can prove god.  
The argument of design accentuates that the natural world 
and what we experience simply cannot be implemented by 
an unintended, inexplicable and random accident. It would 
not be able to produce the beauty, the regularity and order 
of the apparent purpose of nature. 
The order of nature has, as aforementioned, two distinctive 
aspects; the one being of order or regularity, the second 
being the ‘teleological purpose’. Conducting a deeper 
analysis of both aspects, it becomes clear that they 
respectively have their weaknesses but as a composed 
argument it appears as a comprehensive and effective one. 
The sub-argument of regularity emphasizes the importance 
of order. Cleanthes perceives the world as one big machine 
that works with perfect regularity. “Look round the world: 
Contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find 
that it is nothing but one great machine, subdivided into 
an infinite number of lesser machines …”(Popkin ed., 
1998: 15). 
According to Pyle, the argument of regularity falls short 
on the idea of contrivance. If we look empirically around 
the world and its effects, it is evident that they must be 
here for a reason. By investigating the universe 
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observations has led to the conclusion that the whole solar 
system appears to be stable. “Each of the planets follows 
its fixed orbit with mathematical precision, in accordance 
with the universal laws of motion and gravity.” (Pyle, 
2006: 38). From that example an absence of contrivance 
appears. Looking at the universe with empirical methods a 
continuity of order appears. From ‘nothing comes from 
nothing’ one can derive ‘nothing exists without a purpose’. 
Here the second part of the order of nature salvages the 
weakness of the regularity argument. The teleological 
argument is based on the idea of purpose and compensates 
for the regularity argument. The first time Cleanthes 
argues for the analogy grounded on purpose it is 
formulated as following: 
“But is the whole adjustment of means to ends in a 
house and in the universe so slight a resemblance? The 
economy of final causes? The order, proportion, and 
arrangement of every part? Steps of a star are plainly 
contrived that human legs may use them in mounting; and 
this inference is certain and infallible.” Popkin ed., 1998: 
16). 
The construction of the body per example and the 
existence of contingent things cannot derive from anything 
other than an intelligent designer. The contrivance of 
nature is so apparent and obvious that it must be the work 
of an intelligent designer. The teleological argument 
provides an even greater cause for an intelligent designer. 
The part of the argument which is greatly indicated by 
Cleanthes is where purpose and contrivance are in focus as 
he talks about ‘lesser machines’:  
“ … You will find it to be nothing but one big 
machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser 
machines … All these various machines, and even their 
most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an 
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accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who have 
ever contemplated them” (Popkin ed., 1998: 15).  
Inspired by the method practiced by Xenophon, a move to 
anatomy will provide great indication of purpose. The 
anatomical structure of the body greatly illustrates the 
workings of a designed machine. Each organ has its 
distinctive function and is designed to serve a specific 
purpose. The lungs are the vital respiration organ, which 
provides living creatures the function of breathing, the 
brain is the ‘command-center’ of the body, which controls 
everything of what the body is capable of doing. All living 
beings need oxygen, which plants provide us with through 
the process of respiration and photosynthesis. All elements 
and organisms in the natural world are seemingly working 
in harmony and symbiosis. It seems natural to look at 
organisms as being products of intelligent design since the 
contrivance and design seem so apparent. This adaption 
can only be sufficiently clarified and understood in terms 
of a designer. 
The analogy of the relation between humans and human 
artefacts is essentially the same as the relation between 
animals and god.  
“Since therefore the effects resemble each other, we 
are led to infer, by all rules of analogy, that the causes 
also resemble, and that the Author of Nature is somewhat 
similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much 
larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work 
which he has executed” (Popkin ed., 1998: 15). 
       Taking an example of human artefacts, the clock has been 
manufactured for one purpose: The function of displaying 
time. Since artefacts are man made, humans possess the 
understanding of creating a complicated design. It is 
comprehensible to us because we know that the clock and 
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any other artefact derive from creativity and has a specific 
purpose.  
 
Unique Cause Objection 
One of David Hume’s objections towards the argument of 
design is that of the unique cause. The argument of design 
emphasizes the analogy between the causes of human 
designs deriving from a human mind, and the universe 
created by god. However, according to Philo, this act of 
inferring every cause of divine intelligence is to be similar 
to that of human intelligence, which is very weak. The 
nature of analogy is formulated by Philo in the dialogues: 
“... please take a new survey of your principles. 
Like effects prove like causes... Now it is certain that the 
liker the effects are which are seen and the liker the causes 
which are inferred, the stronger is the argument. Every 
departure on either side diminishes the probability and 
renders the experiment less conclusive.” (Popkin ed., 
1998: 34).  
The argument by analogy from design becomes 
consequently stronger the more the effects resemble the 
causes. Or in other words the greater similarity between 
the objects, the stronger the analogy. Thereby the 
argument of design claims that known experience provides 
sufficient grounds for inferring an intelligent being as the 
creator of the universe. Furthermore the definitive 
evidence for a divine being is a postulate from the 
‘evident’ intelligence in the grandeur of nature. Everything 
is by pure observation seen in such harmony that is only 
explicable by its similarity to that of systems known as 
made by man. As experience underlies the creation of 
consciousness, the mind is equally only known to derive 
from man, therefore the concepts of order derives from the 
experience of order in the human mind.    
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The reasoning behind this aspect of the argument of design 
recognizes the use of analogy in order to understand the 
world. However, the uniqueness of a divine cause must be 
considered, as mentioned by Cleanthes in Dialogues: 
“All the planets, are they not earths which 
revolve about the sun?... These analogies and 
resemblances, with others which I have not mentioned, are 
the sole proofs of the Copernican system; and to you it 
belongs to consider whether you have any analogies of the 
same kind to support your theory?” (Popkin ed., 1998: 21). 
The notion of the relationships between objects is what 
underlies the analogy. Gaskin shows how Hume’s unique 
cause objection is based upon other parts of Hume’s 
philosophy as in his analysis of the causal relationship 
between objects: 
“According to Hume if we call x the cause of y 
then we have observed that x and y are contiguous, 
successive with respects to time and have ‘constant 
conjunction in all past instances”(Gaskin, 1978: 20). 
The importance of this is that for an instance to be an 
effect of a certain cause the case must be frequently 
conjoined. Or in other words the cause of an effect must, 
in order for us to infer the relation between two different 
objects, be viewable in many different instances. Thereby 
Hume’s objection is built upon how from experience we 
can infer the effects of causes by the cohesion between 
known instances of that distinct effect to be of that distinct 
cause. This is formulated by Philo as follows: 
“That a stone will fall, that fire will burn, that 
the earth has solidity, we have observed a thousand and a 
thousand times; and when any new instance of this nature 
is presented, we draw without hesitation the accustomed 
inference.” (Popkin ed., 1998: 16). 
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According to Philo, when we attempt to infer an analogy 
from a known experience there is no question that we can 
infer traits found in e.g. humans today to that of humans of 
another time. It becomes a different matter, when we 
proceed with the same instance to animals and vegetables 
(Popkin ed., 1998: 16). The similarity between the 
analogies is reconsidered when met with actual 
observation. 
The case of the argument of design then becomes a case of 
a different matter. According to Gaskin, the reference to 
god as a designer underlines an assumption of god being 
external to the universe: 
“A statement about the internal development of 
the universe, even if it contains or appear to contain 
statements about the origin of unique collections of objects 
such as men or all there is, is arrived at by extrapolation 
from known regularities which are themselves derived 
from repeated or repeatable observations” (Gaskin, 1978: 
21).   
When the universe becomes a unique effect there is no 
experience of such an instance. In this instance it becomes 
impossible to build an analogy by inferring the attributes 
of a human mind to that of a divine being. By building the 
analogy from cause-effect relational instances on the 
‘inside’ it becomes impossible to infer that the case of the 
universe coming into existence should be similar to a man 
building a house i.e. design. Philo speaks again: “…or 
rather may see  that the subject in which you [Cleanthes] 
are engaged exceeds all human reason and inquiry… 
Have you ever seen Nature in any such situation as 
resembles the first arrangement of the elements?” (Popkin 
ed., 1998: 22). 
In brief the Unique Cause Objection makes explicit the 
difficulties in affirming any conclusions about the 
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characteristics of a deity as a consequence of the 
uniqueness of the cause in question. According to Philo, it 
is impossible to affirm the existence of god from the 
argument of design due to the Unique Cause Objection. 
Nevertheless, our lack of experience of worlds coming 
into being alongside the supposed characteristics of the 
deity, causes the impossibility of affirming an analogy 
between the human mind and design to the characteristics 
of god.  
 
Weakness in the Analogy 
Another objection for the argument of design is the fallacy 
of weak analogy. This counter-argument emphasizes the 
weakness of the analogy between a human mind and the 
mind of god. Furthermore it emphasizes the inability for 
the creation of the universe to be the product of a being 
with traits similar to that of humans, namely that of a finite 
mind. Phil’s contention to the analogy is the weakness of 
the two objects considered. As described in the Unique 
Cause Objection section an analogy between objects is 
based upon the amount of similar traits between them. Or 
in other words the higher similarity between two objects 
the stronger the analogy. But the analogical similarities 
between the objects in question are, according to Philo, 
very weak. As considered in the Unique Cause Objection 
section, the idea of the closeness in the characteristics of 
the objects considered are evidently important for an 
analogy to count as any substantial proof. 
Accordingly, the first step for Hume is to accept the 
analogy and argue against the conclusion for the analogy 
on the basis of the same reasoning. Following this 
approach, the weakness of the analogy becomes explicit. 
Philo states: 
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     “You [Demea] seem not to apprehend, replied Philo, 
that I argue with Cleanthes in his own way, and, by 
showing him the dangerous consequences of his tenets, 
hope at least to reduce him to our opinion.” (Popkin ed., 
1998: 17). 
Throughout the Dialogues one of Philo’s disagreements 
with the argument of design is the weakness of the objects 
known to be derived from design and any natural object. 
As formulated by Philo: 
     “…at present when the bounds of nature are so 
infinitely enlarged and such a magnificent scene is opened 
to us? It is still more unreasonable to form our idea of so 
unlimited a cause from our experience of the narrow 
productions of human design” (Popkin ed., 1998: 35). 
By referring to increased interest in the natural sciences, 
Philo emphasizes the difficulty in inferring similarities 
between a supposed creator and the capabilities of 
humans. As a consequence Philo’s argument shows that an 
analogy is utterly insufficient in order to explain the nature 
and creation of the universe. In emphasising a degree of 
complexity to the form and function of the universe 
around us, the analogy to human design is shown 
insufficient. Human design is by such a comparison not 
close to a functional analogy. 
Equally human characteristics i.e. the human mind 
supposed to be those of a possible creator is by Philo 
emphasised as insufficient. An anthropomorphic image of 
god, in connection as to what degree the analogy must 
count i.e. whether the image of god is seen as close to the 
human image as possible or the opposite. In stressing how 
one only ought to disproportion the abilities of the cause to 
the effect, it becomes impossible to ascribe perfection and 
infinity to the supposed divine being (Popkin ed., 
1998:35). 
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Accordingly, an analogy to the abilities of a supposed 
creator, following the reasoning of the argument of design, 
is made explicit. If god is closely similar to a human being 
there is no possibility in any extent to suppose that the 
divine being should have abilities exceeding those of a 
human being (Popkin ed., 1998: 35). Philo’s metaphor for 
this idea is the method of building a ship. The plan for 
building a ship has come to be through a long succession 
of ages i.e. “after multiple trials, mistakes, corrections, 
deliberations, and controversies, [ship building] had been 
gradually improving?” (Popkin ed., 1998: 36). 
By supposing an analogy between human design and the 
entire contents of the universe, the abilities of the deity are 
accordingly limited: “why may not several deities combine 
in contriving and framing the world? This is only so much 
greater to human contrivance” (Popkin ed., 1998: 36). 
When ascribing an agency to god, similar to that of a 
human being, there is no restrictions to whether the creator 
of our universe could be a an incredibly limited individual. 
And as we are not aware of universes apart from our own, 
the form of the known may be the end-result of a limited 
deity, whose poor quality product is our universe. 
Hume also states through the character of Philo: 
“And why not become a perfect 
anthropomorphite?... Epicurus maintained that no man 
had ever seen reason but in a human figure; therefore the 
gods must have a human figure.” (Popkin ed., 1998: 37). 
In proposing such a similarity between god and humans 
the image of god will never live up to the Christian image 
of god: “His power, we allow, is infinite; whatever he wills 
is executed.” (Popkin ed., 1998: 63). God can never be 
asserted as infinite and perfect, according to an analogy to 
man’s characteristics, nor by an analogy to human design. 
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Moving to the opposite part of the scale, or in other words 
to remove the supposed divine being as far from human 
characteristics as possible, entails different problems. For 
the theist it becomes impossible to infer any of the 
characteristics that are important for a Christian god. 
According to Gaskin the necessary characteristics of a 
Christian god, i.e. the most possible deity that the 
argument of design seeks to establish proof of, are 
formulated: “For the activity of a god to account for the 
regularities [in nature] he must be free, rational, and very 
powerful” (Gaskin, 1978: 30). 
An image of god as completely incomprehensible is as a 
result unacceptable. The incomprehensibility of god 
allows for no ability to infer any moral attributes to god, as 
formulated by Cleanthes: 
“The Deity, I can readily allow, possesses 
many powers and attributes of which we can have no 
comprehension. But if our ideas, so far as they go, be not 
just and adequate and correspondent to his real nature, I 
know not what there is in this subject worth insisting on 
[...] their [mystics] temerity must be great if, after 
rejecting the production by a mind; I mean a mind 
resembling the human (for I know no other), they pretend 
to assign, with certainty any other specific intelligible 
cause; and their conscience must be very scrupulous, 
indeed, if they refuse to call the universal unknown cause 
a God or Deity and to bestow on him as many sublime 
eulogies and unmeaning epithets as you shall please to 
require them” (Popkin ed., 1998: 28). 
The revealed image of god cannot be followed as a 
consequence of an inconsistent and poor analogy, that in 
no way covers what is necessary for one to uphold a 
revealed image of god. 
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A different contention to the analogy by Hume is the 
problem in inferring a single part of existence, more 
precisely the human mind to explain everything, is 
emphasised. Philo speaks: 
“We may remark that the operation of one very 
small part of nature, to wit, man, upon another very small 
part, to wit, that inanimate matter lying within his reach is 
the rule by which Cleanthes judges the origin of the 
whole…” (Popkin ed., 1998: 44).  
According to Hume, the form and balance of nature seem 
more possible by itself, than it to be explained by an 
intelligent agent like that of a man (Hume’s concepts of 
vegetation and generation will be developed in the “other 
possible sources of order” chapter). Following the 
reasoning earlier in this chapter, the comparability of 
human mind to the creation of the universe is insufficient 
as a greater understanding of the world is developed. 
Reasons for not inferring an intelligent author 
Philo acts as the spokesperson for the argument against 
inferring an intelligent author. He argues that it is an 
equally sensible idea for the order of things to have fallen 
into place on their own, as it is a sensible idea to believe 
that an intelligent author has made it so: 
“To say that the different ideas which compose 
the reason of the Supreme Being fall into order themselves 
and by their own nature is really to talk without any 
precise meaning. If it has a meaning, I would fain know 
why it is not as good sense to say that the parts of the 
material world fall into order of themselves and by their 
own nature” (Popkin ed., 1998: 31). 
Philo argues that it would be sensible to simply stop at the 
material world and think no further, as not to go on in 
infinitum (Gaskin, 1978: 34). It is in connection with this 
idea that he presents the ideas of Simonides: 
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“And can you blame me, Cleanthes, if I here 
imitate the prudent reserve of Simonides, who, according 
to the noted story, being asked by Hiero, What God Was? 
desired a day to think of it, and then two more; and after 
that manner continually prolonged the term, without ever 
bringing in his definition or description? Could you even 
blame me if I had answered, at first, that I did not know, 
and was sensible that this subject lay vastly beyond the 
reach of my faculties?” (Popkin ed., 1998: 20). 
Philo argues that the very idea of speculating about a 
subject so grandiose as god, using such a minute and weak 
tool as human reasoning, would be futile. We should 
therefore simply stop our speculations at what we know, 
meaning the material world.  
Philo goes on to challenge the reasoning behind an 
intelligent author by presenting a cosmological idea, 
namely that worlds have been created by other worlds. In 
doing so, he compares the idea of intelligent design to the 
other. He thereby attempts to declare Cleanthes’ beliefs as 
improbable as the idea of planets laying eggs. Firstly Philo 
challenges the very idea of the world resembling human 
art. He states that we have to think beyond our abilities in 
order to understand something as vast as the creation of 
the world. In our world there are four principles: reason, 
instinct, generation and vegetation. We know these 
principles from experience but do not fully understand the 
way they operate (Popkin ed., 1998: 45-46).  
We do, however, know from experience, that seeds from a 
tree propagate new trees. Philo stresses the importance of 
finding the source of order within this principle: 
“A tree bestows order and organization on that 
tree which springs from it, without knowing the order: An 
animal in the same manner on its offspring: A bird on its 
nest; and instances of this kind are even more frequent in 
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the world than those of order which arise from reason and 
contrivance” (Popkin ed., 1998: 46-47). 
Hereby Philo challenges the likeliness of a supreme being 
compared to cosmogony. He states that looking at an 
animal leads to the assumption of its derivation from 
another animal. Much like looking at a house and 
recognizing the necessity of a designer. A house is, 
however, not a living thing. It could impossibly have built 
another house. Philo agrees with the underlying logic 
behind the idea of analogy (Popkin ed., 1998: 18). He 
disagrees, however, with Cleanthes’ understanding of both 
the effect and cause: 
“If the universe bears a greater likeness to 
animal bodies and to vegetables than to the works of 
human art, it is more probable that its cause resembles the 
cause of the former than that of the latter, and its origin 
ought rather to be ascribed to generation or vegetation 
than to reason or design” (Popkin ed., 1998: 44). 
When defending the width of the steps within his 
argumentation, Philo simply compares it to that of the 
argument of design: 
“The world, say I, resembles an animal; 
therefore it is an animal, therefore it rose from generation 
… The world, says Cleanthes, resembles a machine; 
therefore it is a machine, therefore it arose from design. 
The steps are here equally wide, and the analogy less 
striking” (Popkin ed., 1998: 47). 
The reason for Cleanthes’ analogy being less striking is, 
according to Gaskin, that: “It is the orderly process of 
animal generation which gives rise to reason, not the other 
way about” (Gaskin, 1978: 35). This will be further 
elaborated in the following chapter. 
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Philo is arguing that it is not sensible to believe in an 
intelligent author since the very idea is less sensible than 
the idea of planets reproducing in a manner resembling the 
procreation of animals. However, it is not likely that Philo 
actually believes in this theory, which is also made clear at 
the end of the Dialogues. He is simply trying to shed light 
on the innate flaws within the argument of design. We 
know nothing except for the things that we can derive 
from experience, through a sceptical approach.   
 
Other possible orders in the universe 
The main focus of this chapter regards the order of the 
universe, and how that order may exist within matter itself 
rather than bestowed upon it by a supreme being. 
Cleanthes finds himself at a loss when arguing about the 
order of things. He starts arguing that, at least, it is not less 
reasonable to believe that order stems from god than from 
matter itself, since the argument of design consequently 
has the same faults regarding matter as it does concerning 
thought: “To prove by experience the origin of the 
universe from mind is not more contrary to common 
speech than to prove the motion of the earth from the same 
principle” (Popkin ed., 1998: 21). In this statement and 
those that follow, Cleanthes questions Philo’s reasoning 
behind his criticism of the argument of design. Cleanthes’ 
contention bases itself upon an insecurity of the 
knowledge that we can derive from experience about the 
celestial objects. Cleanthes’ point is immediately torn 
apart by Philo (Popkin ed., 1998: 21). However, the 
intention of Cleanthes’ failed attempt consists of proving 
Philo’s theory to be as flawed as his own. Thereby, 
Cleanthes admits that the argument of design contains 
fallacies regarding the order of things and that assumptions 
and leaps are required in order to establish a claim. 
 37  
According to Cleanthes, Philo’s theory consequently 
suffers under the same insufficiency. Philo, seemingly, 
agrees: 
“… when it is asked, what cause produces order in 
the ideas of the Supreme Being, can any other reason be 
assigned by you, anthropomorphites, than that it is a 
rational faculty, and that such is the nature of the Deity? 
But why a similar answer will not be equally satisfactory 
in accounting for the order of the world, without having 
recourse to any such intelligent creator as you insist on, 
may be difficult to determine. It is only to say that such is 
the nature of material objects, and that they are all 
originally possessed of a faculty of order and proportion” 
(Popkin ed., 1998: 32). 
According to Gaskin, Philo hereby claims that there is 
inherent orders within either thought or matter, but is 
indecisive regarding which of the two (Gaskin, 1978: 35). 
Thereby we can conclude that Hume rests upon the 
conclusion that an order must exist within either matter or 
thought but that an ultimate answer cannot be found 
regarding which of the two theories we should place our 
beliefs upon. This notion is accordingly characteristic for 
Hume. 
In Part VIII of the Dialogues Philo proposes an interesting 
idea regarding the order of things by reviving ‘the old 
Epicurean hypothesis’, and tinkering with the element of 
time. By considering matter as finite and time as infinite, 
Philo finds a new way of speculating about the way in 
which order is kept throughout the universe. He 
furthermore suggests an idea of how energy is continually 
in motion: “As much as is lost by the composition of 
motion, as much is gained by its resolution” (Popkin ed., 
1998: 50) and he goes on to state that: “There is not 
probably, at present, in the whole universe, one particle of 
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matter at absolute rest.” (Popkin ed., 1998: 50). This 
notion allows him to present the theory that through an 
infinite amount of time matter has been produced and 
destroyed. Meaning that over and over again every 
possible composition was tested until finally one was 
fallen upon. According to Philo, this constant and 
continued creation and destruction allows the world to be 
ever changing while the whole remains the same: 
“Is there a system, an order, an economy of things, 
by which matter can preserve that perpetual agitation 
which seems essential to it, and yet maintain a constancy 
in the forms which it produces?” (Popkin ed., 1998: 50). 
After asking this question Philo proceeds to answer it 
himself, stating that this is the case in the present world. 
Since this hypothesis was proposed unprepared it contains 
several fallacies, which Cleanthes points out with no 
hesitation. Philo subsequently agrees (Popkin ed., 1998: 
52). Thereby Cleanthes and Philo arrive at the conclusion 
that the reason for the upholding of world order is 
unknown. It is consequently just as feasible that this 
particular order originates in matter itself as if it was 
determined by a deity. 
	  
Assessment of the argument of design   
The difficulties with the argument of design are made 
explicit through Philo’s scepticism. As such, the 
objections for the conclusion i.e. the creator of the 
universe in the image of a Christian god, provides 
impossible grounds for inferring any attributes and 
knowledge about the supposed deity. The argument of 
design can only point to a possible designer. Accordingly, 
Philo’s criticism shows that the argument of design is built 
upon assumptions. The qualities of the deity are incapable 
of being inferred as based upon an analogy between 
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human qualities and that of a supposed deity. An 
anthropomorphic quality to the image of god provides yet 
another difficulty to the argument of design, as the degree 
in which the supposed analogy brings greater problems in 
basing similarities between the supposed creators of the 
universe to that of human design. Philo challenges the 
argument of design further by presenting alternative 
theories regarding a first-mover and the preservation of 
order. These he deems as being as likely, if not more. This 
is done by presenting the a posteriori argument, also used 
by Cleanthes, in order to reach an opposing concept and 
thereby adequately compare them. The objective of this 
comparison being to reveal the absurdity of ascribing the 
cause and continued order of things to a deity while other 
possibilities are available to us by applying a few 
alterations to the same logic. The final effect of the 
criticism of the argument of design manifests an inability 
to affirm any attributes to the deity, which is fundamental 
to a revealed image of god. As a result it is impossible to 
affirm an image of god build upon devotion and following 
a certain religion. 
 
A priori 
In Dialogues the character Demea’s foremost claim is 
presented through an a priori argument. According to 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, an a priori argument 
is an argument based on general reasoning. It is an 
argument where the general conviction of humans is the 
justification. Thereby making it possible to make a claim 
without having to further support it (Russell, 2007). It 
differs thereby from an a posteriori argument in the sense 
that neither empirical evidence nor experience is 
necessary, emphasised by Demea in his definition of it: 
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“An a priori argument is one that proceeds by sheer 
thinking, making no use of contingent facts about what the 
world is like. An argument that does appeal to such facts 
is called a posteriori, which is what Cleanthes says that 
his argument is” (Popkin ed., 1998: 54). 
Demea’s critique of the a posteriori argument is 
accordingly justified by its limitation of only being able to 
offer a probable truth as mentioned previously. This leads 
Demea to present his major argument for the existence of 
god. His validation for doing this is that, if valid, it offers a 
conclusion, which must be true. He furthermore states that 
his argument will not face the same difficulties as the a 
posteriori argument of design presented by Cleanthes, as 
only metaphysical arguments can prove god’s unity and 
infinity. His argument, which he refers to as ‘the common 
one’, is presented in Part IX, and reads as follows: 
        “Whatever exists must have a cause or reason for 
its existence, it being absolutely impossible for anything to 
produce itself or be the cause of its own existence. In 
mounting up, therefore, from effects to causes, we must 
either go on in tracing an infinite succession, without any 
ultimate cause at all, or must at last have recourse to some 
ultimate cause, that is necessarily existent: Now, that the 
first supposition is absurd may be thus proved. In the 
infinite chain or succession of causes and effects, each 
single effect is determined to exist by the power and 
efficacy of that cause, which immediately preceded; but 
the whole eternal chain or succession, taken together, is 
not determined or caused by any thing: And yet it is 
evident that it requires a cause or reason, as much as any 
particular object, which begins to exist in time. The 
question is still reasonable why this particular succession 
of causes existed from eternity, and not any other 
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succession or no succession at all. If there be no 
necessarily existent Being, any supposition which can be 
formed is equally possible; nor is there any more 
absurdity in nothing’s having existed from eternity, than 
there is in that succession of causes which constitutes the 
universe. What was it, then, which determined something 
to exist rather than nothing, and bestowed being on a 
particular possibility, exclusive of the rest? External 
causes, there are supposed to be none. Chance is a word 
without meaning. Was it nothing? But that can never 
produce any thing. We must, therefore, have recourse to a 
necessarily existent Being, who carries the reason of his 
existence in himself; and who cannot be supposed not to 
exist without an express contradiction. There is 
consequently such a Being, that is, there is a Deity” 
(Popkin ed., 1998: 54-55). 
Demea’s reference to the argument as a “common one” 
indicates that he claims no credit for inventing it. In 
Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, a 
reader’s guide, Andrew Pyle elaborates on the argument, 
which he claims is a version of the cosmological 
argument, borrowed from Samuel Clarke (Pyle, 2006: 13). 
Samuel Clarke was, according to Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, an important British philosopher whose main 
interests were in the areas of metaphysics, ethics and 
theology. He was both interested in the a posteriori, 
argument of design and the a priori, argument closely 
linked to the one presented by Demea (Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2003). This is accordingly an 
argument that seeks to provide an “ultimate cause or 
explanation that is metaphysically necessary” (Pyle, 2006: 
14). Clarke, however, is paradoxically involved as an 
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evidential source in Cleanthes subsequently critical 
argument (Popkin, 1998:55). 
In Reading Hume’s Dialogues William Lad Sessions 
claims that the argument is rather a derivation of both the 
cosmological and the ontological argument (Sessions, 
2002: 137). Demea’s argument is thus influenced from 
various philosophical ideas. The argument itself is directly 
founded on ‘the Principle of sufficient reasoning’. This 
principle is basically related to the philosophical 
expression: ‘Ex nihilo nihil fit’, which is Latin for 
‘Nothing comes from nothing’, hence Demea’s argument 
(Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2005) 
One of the concerns about Demea’s argument arises in his 
conclusion “There is consequently such a Being, that is, 
there is a Deity” (Popkin, 1998: 55). Accordingly Demea 
concludes  that there exists a Deity but not a specific God, 
whose existence was his overall aim to prove. Other 
critical points of Demea’s argument are subsequently 
being elaborated on by both Philo and Cleanthes in the 
same chapter of Dialogues. 
 
Cleanthes’ Response 
More interesting than the argument itself, is moreover the 
criticism of it, which might prove to resemble Hume’s 
own standpoint. Cleanthes immediately responds to 
Demea, approaching his argument critically. Confidently, 
Cleanthes leads by claiming that the use of arguments 
from pure logic in general is absurd since it does not lead 
to any facts at all, adding that he is willing to “rest the 
whole controversy” (Popkin ed., 1998: 55) on this 
argument. He argues as following: 
“Nothing is demonstrable, unless its contrary implies a 
contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, 
implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, 
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we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no Being, 
therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. 
Consequently there is no Being, whose existence is 
demonstrable” (Popkin, 1998: 55). 
In spite of Cleanthes confidence about his critique, his 
argumentation is rather weak. According to Sessions, the 
argument that Cleanthes here presents contains the fallacy 
of ‘petito principii’. It is seen through the invalid 
assumptions that are necessary for the strength of the 
argument (Sessions, 2002: 140). Demea’s claim that the 
Deity ‘cannot be supposed not to exist without an express 
contradiction’ (Popkin ed., 1998: 56) satisfies Cleanthes’ 
conditions of his arguments since he argues that a 
proposition is evident, if its non-existence is 
inconceivable. In Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion 
in Focus, Stanley Tweyman also elaborates on the 
argument and concludes that Cleanthes has shown that for 
those who find the non-existence of the deity conceivable, 
Demea’s argument demonstrates the necessity of god’s 
existence. However, for those who find it inconceivable, 
Cleanthes’ argument has no strength against Demea’s 
(Tweyman, 1991: 63). 
Cleanthes subsequently claims that Demea’s argument of 
god’s necessary existence cannot be proved, as long as 
man’s faculties are as present. He continuously critiques 
Demea’s claim through an argument related to the 
previous:  
“It will always be possible for us to conceive the non-
existence of something we formerly conceived to exist… So 
the words ‘necessary existence’ have no meaning – or no 
meaning that is consistent” (Popkin, 1998: 55). 
This argument is described by Sessions as being 
understated, but ultimately containing a ‘non sequitor’ 
fallacy. This means that its conclusion does not follow its 
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premises (Sessions, 2002: 141). Cleanthes accordingly 
argues against Demea’s claim of necessity, through 
claiming that it cannot be argued for, as long as it is 
inconceivable to humans. According to Sessions, 
Cleanthes’ argument has a paradoxical fallacy, through 
Cleanthes’ claim about human’s abilities and inabilities. 
Cleanthes, thus argues around the nature of humans in the 
same manner that Demea has argued about the nature of 
god. Cleanthes, however, previously argued that we cannot 
prove anything through the use of a priori arguments. The 
argument presented by Cleanthes here is closely related to 
an a priori argument. His own conclusion is thereby 
invalid, as his earlier premises stated that nothing could be 
definitely proved through the use of such an argument 
(Sessions, 2002: 142). 
Cleanthes furthermore turns to question the chain of 
causes, as presented by Demea: 
“… in tracing an eternal succession of objects it seems 
absurd to inquire for a general cause or first author. How 
can anything that exists from eternity have a cause, since 
that relation implies priority in time and a beginning of 
existence” (Popkin, 1998: 56). 
According to Tweyman, this argument resembles Hume’s 
own account of causation; causes must thus exist prior to 
effects, and that effects therefore are new existences 
(Tweyman, 1991: 65). Cleanthes’ objection seems, 
however, to speak against his arguments. Sessions 
explains that Cleanthes’ claim that nothing existing from 
eternity can have a “... general cause or first author ...” 
(Popkin, 1998: 56), consequently modifies his own 
argument of design. 
Cleanthes’ last critical point concerns the whole world, 
which uniting parts he believes only to be performed as an 
“... arbitrary act of the mind.” (Popkin ed., 1998: 56). He 
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thereby believes that the world consists of numerous 
individual existences that are only, united as an 
establishment, in the human mind. Chains of causes and 
effects consequently have no overall cause, but causes can 
be explained by merely looking at every individual part of 
the chain. This claim once again seems to annihilate his 
argument of design. Sessions argues thus “Without a 
whole world to analogize to a human artifact, there is 
nothing for an Author of Nature to author.” (Sessions, 
2002: 144) 
	  
Philo’s response 
While having entrusted most of the critique of Demea’s 
argument to Cleanthes, Philo ultimately cannot resist 
himself from presenting another point. He argues through 
a mathematical equivalent to the universe. He asks thus 
rhetorically, if the fact that every product of the number 9 
has integers eventually adding up to 9, could not be similar 
to the work of the universe. They are both the effects of 
necessity, which cannot be answered through either human 
algebra or other demonstrable methods (Popkin ed., 1998: 
56-57). This argument is, according to Sessions, highly 
inspired by the philosophy of Epicurus on self-sufficiency 
(Sessions, 2002: 145). Pyle, however, believes it to be 
influenced by the Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza, who 
argued thus: “… the order of Nature is absolutely 
necessary and hence not the result of any wise or 
benevolent choice.” Pyle, continuously claim that this 
argument from Philo threatens Cleanthes’ theological 
claims, since Spinoza believed the universe to be 
contingent and therefore not a result of intelligent design 
(Pyle, 2006: 89). Philo subsequently argues thus: 
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“… I shall venture to add an observation that the 
argument a priori has seldom been found very convincing, 
except to people of a metaphysical head who have 
accustomed themselves to abstract reasoning ... and ... 
have transferred the same habit of thinking to subjects 
where it ought not to have place… Other people, even of 
good sense and the best inclined to religion, feel always 
some deficiency in such arguments, though they are not 
perhaps able to explain distinctly where it lies,  a certain 
proof that men ever did and ever will derive their religion 
from other sources than from this species of reasoning” 
(Popkin ed., 1998: 57). 
While previously having focused on the argument itself, 
Philo now seems to be concerned with the people 
perceiving and presenting it. Philo’s claim opposes 
Demea’s through depriving his reason for being convinced 
by the a priori argument due to his lack of having a 
metaphysical mind. This argument, therefore, 
demonstrates an attack on Demea’s persona rather than his 
argumentation. It hence proves to contain the informal 
fallacy of ‘ad hominem’. It furthermore claims that even 
orthodox people will find something wrong with the 
arguments and eventually turn to other sources to derive 
their religion. 
 
Strength of arguments 
Sessions’ general view on the a priori argumentation in 
Part IX is dominated by curiosity in the weaknesses 
presented by both Demea and Cleanthes. Demea’s 
reasoning seems to differ depending on the course of the 
dialogue where Cleanthes’ poor argumentation will 
eventually questions his credibility (Sessions, 2002: 136-
138). What is furthermore remarkable about Cleanthes is 
how he seems to have adopted several points that Philo 
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argued as a critique to his argument of design, prior to 
Demea’s argued claim. This leads Sessions to consider 
whether Cleanthes is unaware about his two-sided 
argumentation, or if he simply detriments his own 
argument of design in order to definitively ruin Demea’s a 
priori argument, by the use of a counterexample (Sessions, 
2002: 144). Accordingly with Sessions, Tweyman 
concludes that Hume through the a priori argumentation 
demonstrates Philo’s impact on Cleanthes. Hume thus 
needed a new argument in order to do so (Tweyman, 1991: 
68). 
A ventured conclusion on Part IX could be that Hume has 
little regards for both the a priori and the a posteriori 
argument. Demea thus fails to convince his two critical 
oppositions, who immediately respond negatively, leaving 
little respect for the a priori argument. In his critique, 
Cleanthes fails to maintain conviction about his own a 
posteriori argument, which likewise loses credibility. 
Although arguing rather vague, Philo appears successful 
throughout this discussion, since Cleanthes’ argumentation 
resembles strong influence from Philo’s former 
argumentation. 
 
The Argument of Evil 
The Argument of evil is presented by Philo as a 
challenging argument to the existence of a benevolent and 
infinite god as presented by the argument from design. In 
Dialogues the argument is implemented to question the 
nature of the deity. However, originally the argument 
aimed to refute the existence of god.  
There are two different arguments of evil: the inference 
problem, which is the objection to the argument of design, 
and the consistency problem that is the objection to the 
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existence of a powerful and benevolent god. Philo 
introduces the argument of evil in Part X and XI in 
Dialogues. He initiates his argument of evil by stating that 
all creatures on earth, animals as well as humans, are 
constantly tormented by one another, and furthermore, that 
all are bound to experience pain in order to survive 
(Popkin ed., 1998: 59). It is this dissatisfaction that 
encourages actions. Without it, we would feel no hunger 
and would not be driven to eat, we would feel no cold and 
would not be driven to seek shelter and we would feel no 
thirst and would not be driven to drink. (Popkin ed., 1998: 
59). Misery seems to be a necessity, which secures the 
very survival of all creatures “This is the secret chain I 
say, that holds us, we are terrified, not bribed to the 
continuance of our existence.” (Popkin ed., 1998: 62). 
Furthermore, by accumulating, man can avoid the evils 
brought upon him by the hierarchy of nature. However, 
this only leads to new evils such as corruption, injustice, 
violence, war and treachery (Popkin ed., 1998: 60). No 
matter how brave or altruistic man can be, one can never 
be safe from the evils of the mind: madness and 
depression. All this misery does not point to a benevolent 
and omnipotent god. This is the foundation of Philo’s 
argument of evil.  
 
The Inference Problem 
In accordance with Demea, Philo states that it is 
impossible for the human mind to comprehend the nature 
of god (Popkin, 1998: 20). However, as Gaskin suggests, 
man ascribes the deity moral qualities, in accordance with 
the expectation of an omnipotent and benevolent god.  If 
evil was to restrict the inference in the argument of design, 
then it would restrict what sort of god exists. Philo starts 
out by raising Epicurus’ old questions “Is he willing to 
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prevent evil, but not able? then is he omnipotent. Is he 
able, but not willing? then he is malevolent. Is he both 
able and willing? when then is evil?” (Popkin ed., 1998: 
63). When Cleanthes objects, by stating that there is all the 
more happiness and good in life than pain and misery, 
Philo additionally argues that even though we grant this to 
be true, an instance of pain affects us far more than the 
experience of happiness. Misery is the one feeling that 
every individual knows of (Popkin ed., 1998: 61). Even 
though Cleanthes’ statement is allowed true, it is by no 
means evidence of an infinite and altruistic god. The 
existence of such a god would cause no misery, pain, nor 
unhappiness (Popkin ed., 1998: 65).  
“Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by 
chance, surely. From some cause then. Is it from the 
intention of the Deity? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it 
contrary to his intention? But he is almighty. Nothing can 
shake the solidity of this reasoning, so short, so clear, so 
decisive...” (Popkin ed., 1998: 66). 
Through the argument of evil, Philo reaches the 
assumption that god has no moral attributes like those of 
humans. According to Cleanthes and his argument of 
design, the human mind and that of the deity must be 
similar. However, if god has no moral attributes as proven 
through the argument of evil, this cannot be aligned. 
“... whatever he wills is executed: But neither man 
nor any other animal is happy, therefore he does not will 
their happiness. His wisdom is infinite; He is never 
mistaken in choosing the means to any end; But the course 
of nature tends not to human or animal felicity: Therefore, 
it is not established for that purpose ... In what respect, 
then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the 
benevolence and mercy of men?” (Popkin ed., 1998 : 63). 
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Philo here questions why animals and humans are not 
happy, when god should have the will and ability to make 
them. Accordingly, the only explanation seems to be that 
god has no moral attributes. Consequently, his mind 
cannot resemble that of the human being. 
 
The Consistency Problem of Evil  
The consistency problem is the problem of the existence of 
evil in the world and consists of two different branches: 
The General Laws argument and The Optimum World 
Argument. 
 
General Laws Argument 
According to Gaskin, The General Laws Argument reads 
thus: “... evil results from the observance of general laws 
in the universe.” (Gaskin, 1978: 47). Demea makes the 
point in Part X where he states that this world is nothing 
but a fragment of the universe, and the moment we live in 
is just a fraction of eternity. Due to the incapabilities of 
human understanding, man cannot see beyond his own 
experiences. This means that the evil experienced at any 
given moment might be equalised through time and the 
world would end up being generally good, making the 
belief in a benevolent and omnipotent god defensible. 
“This world is but a point in comparison of the 
universe; this life but a moment in comparison of eternity. 
The present evil phenomena, therefore, are rectified in 
other regions, and in some future period of existence. And 
the eyes of men, being then opened to larger views of 
things, see the whole connection of general laws, and 
trace, with adoration, the benevolence and rectitude of the 
Deity through all the mazes and intricacies of his 
providence.” (Popkin ed., 1998: 64) 
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Philo considers four circumstances of evil in Dialogues, 
one of them being the circumstance of General Laws. The 
first of Philo’s solutions to this circumstance would be that 
god would avoid evil by conduction everything by 
particular determinations. The other would be that god 
would turn all issues, which we call chance into good 
effects. 
According to John Hick, the course of nature would be 
broken and evolutionary selection is impossible if Philo’s 
solutions were reality. A world without evolutionary 
selection would be a very different world. However, it 
would be even worse from the Christian point of view. 
Good as understood in Christianity can only be reached 
through continual experience and by overcoming 
challenges. The deity would not have the same love and 
desire for his creatures, since they would not have proven 
good. This argument might then be the argument against 
evil and a way of protecting the belief in a benevolent god. 
(Gaskin, 1978: 48) 
 
The Optimum World Argument 
The Optimum World Argument argues that the evil we 
experience in the world is a necessity and the world we 
experience is the best possible world created with the 
means at hand (Gaskin, 1978: 49). According to Nelson 
Pike, this is the argument that solves the problem of evil as 
he states “Within a theology which takes the existence of 
an omnipotent and benevolent god as given, the existence 
of evil in the world must be consistent with the existence of 
such a god” (Gaskin, 1978: 50). Pike’s argument explains 
how evil in the world can be compatible with an 
omnipotent and benevolent god. If it is granted that the 
pain and suffering experienced in the world lead to greater 
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happiness and goods, then it is ‘logical’ that an altruistic 
god would allow this misery. The mere ‘possibility’ that a 
perfect and omnipotent deity is compatible with evil is 
enough for theists to defend their beliefs (Gaskin, 1978: 
50). However, just because the theory is possible, it does 
not mean that it is plausible. Gaskin interprets Hume’s 
opinion to be that these can only be the words of a happy 
and content man who “... is placed in ease and security...” 
(Gaskin, 1978: 49) whereas a man placed in actual misery 
would only find this explanation an annoyance. Another 
issue within the Optimum World argument is that in order 
to make it a useful argument, it is necessary to investigate 
whether the world we live in, with the amount of evil it 
contains, actually is better than other worlds. This is 
impossible to prove and even investigate since humans are 
limited and have no chance of understanding neither how 
this world truly functions nor how it compares to other 
worlds. It is only possible to judge on the world of which 
we have experience. This experience explains that evil 
should and could be avoided if god was truly omnipotent 
and benevolent. From experience we know that some evils 
can be avoided and are not necessary, since medical 
development has cured diseases, which previously proved 
fatal. If certain evils obviously are not necessary, the 
remaining ought likewise not to be. Gaskin argues for the 
invalidity of The Optimum Argument, since the idea of 
‘the best of all possible worlds’ can never be investigated 
or proven. He finds this argument obscure and states that 
no argument can ever be formulated regarding logical 
proof or disproof of this world being the best it can 
possibly be (Gaskin, 1978: 50).     
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The four circumstances of evil 
Philo’s argument of evil is grounded in the presence of 
moral and physical evil, which should not exist in a 
universe created by a benevolent god. He considers four 
main circumstances of evil which are unavoidable and 
necessary. The first circumstance is the device of the 
animal that creates pain and lessening of pleasure when in 
need of necessities in nature. Why are men not constructed 
exclusively by pursuit of pleasure but instead by pursuit of 
pleasure and avoidance of pain? Philo suggests that it 
would be more sensible with a system in which human 
actions were based exclusively on a possible increase or 
decrease of pleasure (Popkin ed., 1998: 69-70). 
The second circumstance is that everything in the universe 
is governed by natural law. God must have a good reason 
not to interfere and suspend these laws in order to, for 
instance, save a child from dying. Philo suggests that the 
deity might conduct everything by particular violations by 
turning all evil into good. According to Hick, the serious 
hazards would be removed by a system of divine 
intervention. By this, all animals and organisms would not 
have to learn to move circumspectly (Gaskin, 1978: 48). 
The course of nature would be broken by this first 
suggestion and the evolutionary selection would be 
impossible. This world would be worse seen from the view 
of Christianity since god’s desires in his creatures would 
only be created within a long process of experience “...in 
response to challenges and disciplines” (Gaskin, 1978: 
48). Furthermore, Philo suggests that the deity should 
contain the ability to turn chance into positive results by 
changing the ways of General Laws. This would make the 
world a safer place to live but the illness would still mutate 
but without producing any new and deadly infections. Evil 
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is unavoidable in order to maintain the knowledge of 
science and a good life understood by Christians. 
The third circumstance is the great frugality. All powers 
and abilities are distributed to particular beings. These are 
only distributed in a certain amount to survive and never in 
the amount that allows the being to thrive. Hume’s 
observation is here that the human race has been granted a 
superior intellect but therefore suffer physical 
insufficiencies (Popkin ed., 1998: 71). He goes on to state 
that, according to this third circumstance, the main source 
of evil is idleness within the human race. Were we 
therefore to be granted an enhanced “...propensity to 
industry and labor, a more vigorous spring and activity of 
mind...” (Popkin ed., 1998: 71) we would occupy 
ourselves to a larger degree and thus evil would be 
diminished along with idleness. Gaskin disputes this by 
stating that if men were endowed with twice as much 
labour it would merely result with good men would 
working twice as hard for good and evil men working 
twice as hard for evil. Thus, the world but be no different: 
“The result would not be more secure or happy men, but 
more powerful men; physical evil might be fractionally 
diminished but at the cost of an enormous potential 
increase in moral evil” (Gaskin, 1978: 52). 
The last and fourth circumstance is: “...the inaccurate 
workmanship of all springs and principles of the great 
machine of nature” (Popkin ed., 1998: 73), The conditions 
of nature have to be perfect and too much or too little of 
something causes natural disasters. We need rain and heat 
to contain life on Earth but too much of either leads to 
disasters. This however never occurs to such an excess that 
life suffers extermination.  
If these four circumstances did not exist, we would feel no 
misfortune. Philo therefore questions why this suffering 
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and death is allowed if the universe is governed by a 
benevolent deity. It seems possible that physical pain 
could be abolished without changing the laws of nature. 
Philo is arguing towards a conclusion where the existence 
of a benevolent god is possible but improbable:  
“His existence is improbable because the simplest 
and most obvious construction which can be put upon the 
phenomena is consistent with it. But his existence remain 
possible because there may yet be some way (so far 
undiscovered) of showing how god’s benevolence could be 
consistent with the facts of evil” (Gaskin, 1978: 54). 
In Dialogues Philo implements evil in order to determine 
the nature of god and argue against Cleanthes argument of 
design. The whole debate ends by Philo concluding that 
god is neutral, morally indifferent and has no relation to 
evil: 
“There may four hypotheses be framed concerning 
the first causes of the universe: that they are in endowed 
with perfect goodness; that they have perfect malice; that 
they are opposite and have both goodness and malice; that 
they have neither goodness nor malice. Mixed phenomena 
can never prove the two former unmixed principles; and 
the uniformity and steadiness of general laws seem to 
oppose the third. The fourth, therefore, seems by far the 
most probable” (Popkin ed., 1998: 75). 
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Hume’s role in the dialogues 
Numerous interpreters and philosophers have since the 
release of Dialogues aimed at locating Hume’s own point 
of view within one of the characters. This, however, has 
proven more difficult than expected. According to James 
Fieser, Hume’s decision to write in the dialogue form was, 
as mentioned earlier, a direct consequence to the power of 
the religious leaders in Great Britain. In order to avoid 
political confrontation Hume decided to present his 
argument through the three different characters of Demea, 
Cleanthes and Philo. This enabled him to disguise the 
revelation of his own standpoint (Fieser, 1997). Hume’s 
use of the dialogue form is within philosophy not a unique 
case. Major recognised philosophers such as Plato, 
Galileo, Malebranche and Berkeley have thus taken 
advantage of this style of writing. According to Pyle, the 
dialogues of these philosophers, however, differ from 
Dialogues, since they have used characters as direct 
representatives for their philosophies (Pyle, 2006: 24). 
However, the strength of the arguments along with the 
views being expressed in his other works gives good 
indications on Hume’s actual views on religion. Some 
have interpreted the character of Philo to be the voice of 
Hume, while others believe him to be a hybrid between the 
characters. As a consequence to the posthumously 
publication, the only hints of his own role within 
Dialogues come from the later published personal letters 
sent by Hume. This chapter aims to determine whether 
Hume can even be uncovered as being the subject of one 
or more of the characters. 
According to Fieser, Hume offers his first indications of 
his own role in the dialogues in 1751 through a letter to 
Gilbert Elliot of Minto, in which he requests feedback on 
what is believed to be a draft of the last chapter. In this 
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letter Hume explains his decision of writing in the 
dialogue form. He justifies thus that “a Variety of 
Character & Genius being upheld, woud make the whole 
look more natural & unaffected” (Fieser, 1997). This 
explains his choice to a large extent, since this style of 
writing consequently favours a more interpretive context, 
provided by the many disagreeing interpreters. Hume 
might have intended to end his work with an unsettled 
conclusion. If this is the case, his motives for doing so 
might very well to avoid public censorship, due to its 
controversial perspective. He describes, however, the best 
method in writing dialogues as follows: 
“I have often thought, that the best way of composing a 
Dialogue, wou'd be for two Persons that are of different 
Opinions about any Question of Importance, to write 
alternately the different Parts of the Discourse, & reply to 
each other. By this Means, that vulgar Error woud be 
avoided, of putting nothing but Nonsense into the Mouth of 
the Adversary” (Fieser, 1997). 
Hume furthermore elaborates on the characters, in 
particular those of Philo and Cleanthes. Accordingly, he 
predicts that Elliott is likely to perceive Cleanthes as the 
hero of the dialogue, and even appeals to a strengthening 
of his arguments. This indicates Cleanthes’ argument to be 
a somewhat rhetorical argument, due to Hume’s awareness 
of its weakness. It does, however, imply that Hume had 
some sympathy for the character of Cleanthes. He adds, 
furthermore, that any argument against those of Cleanthes’ 
forced themselves through his mind unwillingly: “Any 
Propensity you imagine I have to the other Side, crept in 
upon me against my Will” (Fieser, 1997). Thus Hume 
indicates that his will to believe in god was denied by his 
reasoning. This resembles arguments of Philo who, during 
the dialogues, claims that reasoning is the direct way to a 
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larger truth (Popkin, 1998: 7). Hume subsequently turns to 
a rather significant revelation: 
“Had it been my good Fortune to live near you, I shou'd 
have taken on me the Character of Philo, in the Dialogue, 
which you'll own I coud have supported naturally enough: 
And you woud not have been averse to that of Cleanthes. I 
believe, too, we coud both of us have kept our Temper very 
well; only, you have not reach'd an absolute philosophical 
Indifference on these Points. What Danger can ever come 
from ingenious Reasoning & Enquiry? The worst 
speculative Sceptic ever I knew, was a much better Man 
than the best superstitious Devotee & Bigot.” (Fieser, 
1997). 
This claim appears as an immediate conclusion to Hume’s 
role in the dialogues. Hume thus favours the sceptic mind 
to any superstitious, pointing towards Philo as his 
spokesman. There are, however, various points worth 
noticing in this letter. Fieser emphasizes that Hume aims at 
presenting every position from its best angle (Fieser, 
1997). Interesting about this part is, furthermore, that 
Hume mentions the unfulfilled condition of living closer to 
Elliott. This would accordingly have encouraged him to 
adopt the character of Philo as his own. The lack of this 
condition is therefore likely to entail the opposite, leading 
Hume to distance himself from Philo. It seems thus likely 
to conclude that the character of Philo resembles certain of 
Hume’s views, although he has been edited in order to 
make Philo more acceptable for the surrounding society. 
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Hume’s beliefs 
Almost systematic evasions of certain positions in 
Dialogues pose the question of where it is possible to 
fasten Hume to a specific position in the matters of 
religion. The philosophical points as emphasised in our 
argumentation analysis show the quite substantial counter-
argumentation to the cosmological (a priori) and argument 
of design (a posteriori). Following this it becomes possible 
to assume Hume’s position according to the interesting 
philosophical points in this discussion. At the same time it 
is possible to infer Hume’s position, when comparing 
these to Hume’s other texts i.e. Of Miracles, Of Suicide, Of 
the Immortality of the Soul and his letters. 
Firstly the essay Of Miracles is based upon a discussion by 
Hume of the validity of testimony of miracles. The 
miracles as presented in the bible are based upon the 
testimonies of apostles and their followers (Popkin ed., 
1998: 107). 
The fundamental thinking presented by Hume is that our 
knowledge is solely derived from experience. The natural 
laws that are formed by man are derived from the constant 
experience of predictable patterns in nature that stems with 
effects of causes as met in experience of life. As such, a 
reasonable man is one who only bases his knowledge upon 
infallible proof. These proofs are accepted according to the 
highest amount of instances of the correlation between 
cause and effect. The natural laws that are considered 
correlates with the rest of infallible experience (Popkin 
ed., 1998: 108). In other words knowledge extracted from 
empirical observation that weighs the amount of one 
instance over the other in order to conclude the most 
possible answer. According to Hume, these principles may 
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not change when met by human testimony (Popkin ed., 
1998: 109). 
When this knowledge is met by instances of testimonies 
which confront our natural commonsense understanding of 
the functions of the world i.e. miracles, we see ourselves 
situated in a dilemma between the testimony being correct 
or incorrect. The dilemma of a miracles stand by its nature 
i.e. that it breaks with the knowledge about the workings 
of nature. The testimony of a miracle becomes proof in 
itself, as no other evidence is provided. The nature of the 
natural laws that stem from our experience equally stands 
as direct proof against miracles as they are grounded in the 
physical world (Popkin ed., 1998: 111). As a consequence 
Hume’s argument becomes:  
“... that no testimony is enough to establish a 
miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its 
falsehood be more miraculous, than the fact, which it 
endeavors to establish: And even in that case there is a 
mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only 
gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, 
which remains after deducting the inferior.” (Popkin ed., 
1998: 112). 
As such the testimony of miracles stands in accordance 
with the credibility of the person who testifies, firstly the 
credibility of the men in question i.e. if a group of people 
who are questionable in wisdom, knowledge etc. the 
credibility is questionable. Secondly, the object that we do 
not have any experience of resembles that which we have, 
namely that our understanding of the world influences the 
ways in which we perceive the world around us. Thirdly, 
all miracles are mostly witnessed by ignorant and 
questionable people. Fourthly, every miracle is sought to 
establish the religion within which it is attributed (Popkin 
ed., 1998: 112-116). 
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The systems of religion are arguments against the other. 
Even though Hume presents this strong argument against 
miracles as they are brought about by testimony his 
position still is difficult to define as he continues: 
“…those dangerous friends or disguised 
enemies to the Christian religion, who have taken to 
defend it by the principles of human reason. Our most holy 
religion is based upon faith, not on reason” (Popkin ed., 
1998: 124). 
Even though Hume positions himself strongly against the 
theistic arguments for god, and the entire foundation for 
the religion becomes questionable, he allows himself to 
remain accepted by the general population. Equally, a 
result of the thoroughgoing scepticism by Hume, the form 
of the church becomes questionable. As the entire 
foundation from which it exists i.e. miracles of 
resurrection, the last supper etc. through the notion of 
these miracles’ evidential merits to the supposed validity 
of the entire religion is left to consider the testimonies. 
Then according to Hume: “It contradict sense, though both 
the scripture and tradition, on which it is supposed to be 
built, carry not such evidence [of validity of testimony] 
with them as sense” (Popkin ed., 1998: 107). 
Following this quite systematic criticism of the foundation 
of Christianity on reason, the contents of Of Suicide runs 
with similar criticism. Popkin writes in his introduction to 
this edition of Dialogues that a common view regarding 
the subject of suicide finds it to be a serious crime of the 
time (Popkin ed., 1998: xvii). Along these lines Hume’s 
questioning of this subject considers the moral 
implications and fundamental effects upon nature, by the 
act of suicide. 
Hume emphasizes the forming powers of “philosophy” in 
the sense of a fundamental sceptical attitude towards a 
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thoughtless and uncritical attitude. Philosophy becomes an 
antidote towards the ills of superstition and their 
foundation on ‘false opinion’ (Popkin ed., 1998: 97). 
The question becomes a challenge to the established 
opinion of suicide as presented by the church.  As Hume 
presents the possibility of humans to control whether they 
wish to commit suicide or not, as even though humans 
manipulate with singular instances of nature, the general 
continuance of nature is untouched (Popkin ed., 1998: 99). 
As man is also ruled by the laws of nature, the act of 
saving a life should be viewed equally as ill as taking one 
or one’s own. The argument of the damnation following 
the act of suicide is a thought of positioning the human life 
in accordance to a special position despite its 
connectedness to the laws of nature.  As fundamental to 
the natural laws that governs the universe, the act of taking 
one’s own life has no effect. 
Equally the effect of suicide upon society is similarly 
ineffectual. A man who commits suicide does no harm, he 
only ceases to do good (Popkin ed., 1998: 103). The 
supposed crime of committing suicide is contingent to the 
interest of the public (Popkin., 1998: 104). It is even better 
for society as the person marked by the wish of suicide 
provides less good than he would dead. 
The confrontation of the views upon suicide by Hume is 
marked by the freedom of the individual in connection to 
the working laws of nature and the fundamental reason as 
the only way to understand this relationship. 
The role of logic as the sole provider of truth about the 
world around us becomes the antidote from which it is 
possible to see that suicide and our position in life are not 
derived from the sayings of the religious institution and 
society as such, but by the workings of nature. 
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In Hume’s essay Of the Immortality of the Soul he 
accounts for three different arguments for the soul to be 
immortal. From the beginning he states that it seems very 
difficult to prove and that the question has arisen from the 
revelation alone. The first argument is the metaphysical 
where the soul is considered immaterial and cannot belong 
to any material substance. Mind and body are dependent 
on each other.  It cannot be decided a priori since the 
questions of fact cannot be decided by abstract reasoning. 
Matter and spirit is unknown since the idea of knowledge 
is derived from experience. Since it is a matter of nature 
we are allowed to draw a conclusion by analogy and by 
experience. The second line of arguments are based on the 
moral arguments which are derived from the justice of god 
and “... is supposed to be further interested in the further 
punishment of the vicious and reward of the virtuous” 
(Popkin ed., 1998: 92). Hume questions the rules of 
punishment and from whom they have been described. 
Punishment is against our moral ideas of justice and 
goodness and should bear some proportion of offence. It is 
nature that has made humans fragile and mortal and 
“…half of the mankind die before they are rational 
creatures.” (Popkin ed., 1998: 95). The third argument is 
the physical argument and, according to Hume, a very 
strong one for the fact that the soul is mortal. All creatures 
perish in the earth. By the analogy with nature nothing can 
continue after its death. Everything is in common between 
body and soul and therefore depends on each other.  By 
this Hume concludes that it is probable that the soul is 
mortal. 
As seen in this discussion of Hume’s different texts 
concerning the topic of religion it is difficult to determine 
Hume’s position. His unwilling-fullness to form 
concretely formulated answers for a deity shows either a 
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great desire to disguise his beliefs or a reluctance from 
Hume based on faith. 
From Dialogues alone it is unreasonable to draw any final 
conclusions on Hume’s views on religion. Since the points 
advocated in Dialogues are rather hidden they must be 
compared to some of Hume’s other philosophical works in 
the quest of finding his own true principles and beliefs on 
the subject of religion. By shedding light on other selected 
literature by Hume the three essays Of Suicide, Of 
Miracles and Of the Immortality of the Soul, a deeper 
understanding of Hume’s view on religion appears. 
By including these essays as well as some of the letters 
Hume wrote to his acquainted Gilbert Elliot, forwarding 
his personal thoughts on the dialogues, a similarity to the 
character Philo emerges. Throughout the dialogues Philo 
undertakes the position of scepticism. Up until Part XII, 
Philo argues against the argument of design presented by 
Cleanthes, but suddenly he changes his position and 
almost agrees with Cleanthes. It could seem as though 
Hume forwards his opinions through the voice of Philo, 
but a recurring trend of forming a different position part 
from the philosophical points masks Hume’s exact opinion 
concerning the matter. The character of Philo’s relentless 
criticism of a theistic position based upon the reasoning of 
Cleanthes and Demea would on the base of Dialogues 
itself create an idea of a fideistic standpoint. By 
disregarding all reasoning in providing answers to the 
infinite and perfect creator, we learn that ‘holy religion’ 
stems from faith, not reason (Popkin ed., 1998: 124). 
The notion of fideism becomes improbable when 
following Hume’s thoughts about natural law. If we 
consider human minds as ‘Tabula Rasa’ our entire 
consciousness derives from experience. Reason becomes 
the only path towards the truth about the world, as 
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mentioned in Of Miracles. If our world is derived from 
experience and there is no knowledge about either divine 
beings or the creation of the universe, it is impossible to 
infer any knowledge about whether a divine being exists 
or not. Even though we have revelation it is still 
impossible to infer any knowledge about the creation of 
the world from the workings of a possible deity, as it is 
only suppositions based on nothing from experience. 
It becomes impossible from his own position to infer any 
existence of a deity. Equally it is impossible to infer the 
deity’s non-existence. The argumentation against the 
design and cosmological arguments as well as Of Suicide, 
Or Miracles and Of the Immortality of the Soul sees it 
possible that there exist other possible sources of order and 
connections than that of a revealed Christian religion. And 
as such faith alone does not stand as a sufficient 
foundation for the explanation of the world and the 
universe. 
The assumptions underlying the moral laws that see 
themselves shared by institutions who seek to utilize the 
gospel in accordance with their own interest are equally 
criticised by Hume (Popkin ed., 1998: 82). A critique of 
such instances seems more plausible than a fideistic 
standpoint. As mentioned earlier, according to fideism, 
reason stands apart from faith. Or in other words that one 
must take a leap of faith and look away from the sayings 
of reason. However, following Hume's reasoning, faith 
does not provide greater truths than that of reason, and a 
greater possibility stands that he seeks to cover his 
position as sceptical towards the foundations of religion. 
Therefore it is not plausible in following Hume’s 
philosophy to recognize him as a fideist. As the results of 
our analysis shows. 
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Therefore Hume’s sceptical position towards the 
question of theology positions him where it is impossible 
for him to either affirm or deny god’s existence. As our 
argumentation analysis has shown there is an inability to 
confidently infer the existence of god through experience 
and pure reasoning.  
 
Conclusion 
Through Dialogues David Hume’s view on religion can be 
said to support a rather sceptical approach. Of the three 
characters the orthodox Demea appears to present the 
weakest arguments. Hume thus distances himself from the 
superstitious and unquestionable faith in god’s nature and 
existence. The empiricist character of Cleanthes certainly 
receives some attention from Hume who seems to 
somehow sympathize with his empiricist approach to 
religion. Philo, however, is the character that resembles 
Hume’s philosophy the most, which Hume also indicates 
in the letter to Gilbert Elliot. Hume shares Philo’s sceptical 
approach that entails questioning any matter of fact and 
avoids concluding without certainty. In accordance with 
all of the characters Hume does not deny religion. His aim 
with Dialogues is thus to sceptically question the various 
foundations of religion including philosophical arguments 
for the existence of god, which have formerly been 
generally accepted. 
By including other of Hume’s works his empiricist 
standpoint is emphasised in order to justify his critique of 
the theological arguments for the existence and attributes 
of a supposed creator. Due to the limitations of reasoning, 
humans are incapable of inferring any absolute truths 
about the universe and existence as such through 
reasoning. It is consequently impossible to affirm or deny 
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the existence of a deity. It is difficult to situate Hume 
within the theological texts implemented in this 
project.  As a consequence, an arguable uncertainty lies in 
defining Hume’s views as being atheistic or not. This 
question depends to an extent on the definition of atheism, 
which seems to differ throughout time. This project has 
through this investigation, thus established Hume as a 
religious sceptic.  
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